Pace International Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 2 Spring 2018

Article 4

April 2018

Between Power Politics and International Economic Law: Asian
Regionalism, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S.-China Trade
Relations
Jiangyu Wang
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, lawwjy@nus.edu.sg

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law
Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Jiangyu Wang, Between Power Politics and International Economic Law: Asian Regionalism, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S.-China Trade Relations, 30 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 383 (2018)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/20/2018 12:27 PM

BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:
ASIAN REGIONALISM, THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AND U.S.-CHINA
TRADE RELATIONS
Jiangyu Wang*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the interactions of power politics and
international economic law in the development of regionalism in
Asia, particularly in the context of United States-China trade
relations. It argues that the process of regional economic
integration in Asia has been slow-moving because of the
politicization of regionalism by power rivalries. China’s initial
regional integration initiatives apparently ignored the United
States, a superpower which has always been a major player in Asia
and an indispensable part of the region’s economic process. The
United States-led Trans-Pacific Partnership was allegedly designed
to exclude China, Asia’s largest economy. On the other hand, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership also spurred the effects of competitive
liberalization, pushing China to deepen its economic reform
domestically and engage its trading partners on friendlier terms at
regional and international levels. The demise of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership does not amount to the death of its cutting-edge rules.
Those rules have laid a solid foundation for developing high-
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standard template agreements for Free Trade Agreements of the
next generation, and many of them are likely to be incorporated
into an upgraded multilateral trading system. United States’
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership offers a golden
opportunity for Asian countries to establish a real Pan-Asia free
trade area through the negotiations for the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, but in the long run,
regional integration in Asia should look beyond Asia and include
the economies of the American side of the Pacific for both
economic and strategic reasons. The Article concludes with a few
suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION

Regional/Free Trade Agreements (“RTAs” or “FTAs”) are
the talk of the town in the Asia-Pacific.1 On October 5, 2015,
twelve Pacific Rim countries, led by the United States (“U.S.”),
announced the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPP”),2 which was signed
on February 4, 2016.3 U.S.’ involvement in the TPP, however,
was terminated by Donald J. Trump, America’s newly-elected
president, while it was waiting for ratification (mainly by the U.S.)
to enter into force.4 Meanwhile, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (“RCEP”), another mega-trade agreement,
has been negotiated by the ten members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) and its six FTA partners
since 2012.5 Additionally, in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party,
the ruling party of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or
“China”), announced at its 18th Party Congress that China would

1

Preferential trade agreements are usually called FTAs by countries
negotiating and signing them, but the World Trade Organization officially uses
RTAs. See Regional Trade Agreements, WTO (Sep. 1, 2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.html.
2
Jessica Glenza, The TPP deal: US and 11 other countries reach
landmark Pacific trade pact, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/05/trans-pacific-partnershipdeal-reached-pacific-countries-international-trade.
3
Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal signed in Auckland, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35480600.
4
In November of 2017, the other eleven members of the TPP agreed to
continue the TPP without the U.S. The new pact is called the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. See Lee U-Wen In
Danang, Trans-Pacific Partnership deal moves ahead without US, STRAITS
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), http://www.straitstimes.com/world/tpp-deal-movesahead-without-us.
5
REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP),
ASEAN, http://asean.org/?static_post=rcep-regional-comprehensive-economicpartnership (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
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“accelerate implementation of the strategy of building free trade
areas.”6
The TPP (and its possible successor Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans-Pacific Parnternship (“CPTPP”)), RCEP, and
China’s enhanced FTA programme are landmark developments in
the ongoing economic regionalism in Asia. Regionalism, known
as regional economic integration, is a process that brings the
markets of countries—usually, but not always, in the same
region—together to achieve free movement of goods, services,
capital, labor, and possibly other economic factors of production
through intergovernmental initiatives, mainly including FTAs.7
Richard Pomfret notes that there have been three waves of
regionalism since the inception of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in 1947.8 The first wave started in
Europe in the 1950s when six Western European countries began
to work on regional economic integration, which led to the
establishment of a customs union in the 1960s.9 The second wave
of regionalism was initiated by the bilateral and regional trade
negotiations in North America, which resulted in the establishment
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) in
1993.10 We are now, however, witnessing the third wave of
regionalism that emerged in the early 2000s, which, for the first
Hú Jǐntāo (胡锦涛) [Hu Jintao], Hújǐntāo Zài Zhōngguó
Gòngchǎndǎng Dì Shíbā Cì Quánguó Dàibiǎo Dàhuì Shàng de Bàogào (胡锦涛
在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告) [Hu Jintao at the Eighteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China Report], PEOPLE’S DAILY
(May 1, 2017), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151.html
(emphasis added).
7
See Jiangyu Wang, China, India, and Regional Economic Integration
in Asia: The Policy and Legal Dimensions, 10 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 269, 269-70
(2006).
8
Richard Pomfret, Is Regionalism an Increasing Feature of the World
Economy?, 30 WORLD ECON. 923, 924 (2007); see generally Theresa Carpenter,
A Historical Perspective on Regionalism, in MULTILATERALIZING
REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 13 (Richard
Baldwin & Patrick Low eds., 2009).
9
Pomfret, supra note 8, at 924-25.
10
Id. at 925.
6
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time, now focuses on East Asia, “partly stimulated by a perception
that the global economic institutions let the region down in the
1997 Asian Crisis and partly by the increase of China’s economic
power.”11
Regionalism in East Asia has its early initiatives dating
back to two decades ago, marked by the formation of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (“AFTA”) in 1992.12 The AFTA, however, could
not be taken as the serious beginning of this region’s
regionalization as its performance was rather “dismal”13 and “had
minimal economic impact.”14
As such, “[b]efore 2000,
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region was distinguished by its
absence.”15
Regional economic integration in Asia was accelerated
when China, followed by Japan, Korea, and other countries,
jumped on the bandwagon. China kicked off the current wave of
economic regionalism in Asia by proposing the ASEAN-China
Free Trade Agreement (“ACFTA”) in 2000, which was quickly
followed by the conclusion of a Framework Agreement with an
Early Harvest Programme in 2002, and the formation of a full
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area in 2010.16 In the decade after the
ACFTA Framework Agreement, Asian negotiators had witnessed
the competition between the ASEAN+3 model endorsed by China

11

Id.
See Rahul Sen, “New Regionalism” in Asia: A Comparative Analysis
of Emerging Regional and Bilateral Trading Agreements involving ASEAN,
China and India, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 553, 554 (2006); see generally Tan, Lay
Hong & Samtani, Anil The Shifting Paradigm in Regional Economic
Integration: The ASEAN Perspective, TLH02/02 (Aug. 22, 2002),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=325484.
13
Tan & Samtani, supra note 12, at 1.
14
RICHARD POMFRET, REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA: WHY HAS IT
FLOURISHED SINCE 2000 AND HOW FAR WILL IT GO? 25 (World Sci. 2011).
15
Id.
16
See generally Jiangyu Wang, China’s Regional Trade Agreements
(RTAs) Approach: the Law, the Geopolitics and the Impact on the Multilateral
Trading System, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L LAW 119 (2004).
12
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and the ASEAN+6 model favored by Japan.17 While it was still
believed by many in Asia that economic integration would
eventually be achieved through the adoption of either of the two
models, the emergence of the TPP put both aside, at least for a few
years until Donald J. Trump signed an executive order to pull his
country out of the TPP in his first week as the 45th President of the
United States.18
For the Asians, regional integration makes sense both
economically and geo-strategically. A report of the Asian
Development Bank (“ADB”) suggested that “[r]egional
cooperation, effectively structured and implemented, is a powerful
new tool in Asia’s policy arsenal. It can help Asia address regional
challenges as well as provide stronger foundations for its global
role.”19 But, major Asian economies, including China, Japan,
Korea, and the ASEAN countries, were already busy with
negotiating and concluding FTAs of their own before regionallevel integration achieved some meaningful progress. When
national ambitions and regional ideas are intertwined, the
regionalization process is inevitably complicated by national
interests, nationalist sentiments in historic and contemporary
bilateral relations, and power politics.
On the other hand, regional integration is also necessarily a
legalization progress. Through FTAs, countries establish rules and
standards to govern their external economic relations, and agree to
bind themselves to legal obligations under international economic
law. As observed by Joel Trachtman, “[r]egionalism presents
many faces to the international economic law system. Regional
17
Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Multilateralizing Regional
Trade Arrangements in Asia, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 495, 500-504 (Richard
Baldwin & Patrick Low eds., 2009).
18
David Smith, Trump withdraws from Trans-Pacific Partnership amid
flurry of orders, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:46 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/23/donald-trump-first-orderstrans-pacific-partnership-tpp.
19
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EMERGING ASIAN REGIONALISM: A
PARTNERSHIP FOR SHARED PROSPERITY 13 (2008).
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integration creates international economic law subsystems.”20 A
particular model of bilateral or regional economic arrangements,
once it is codified into RTAs/FTAs as such part of international
economic law, will impose constraints on state behavior. That is
probably why, knowing the consequences of legalization, none of
the major economies in Asia would easily subscribe to the regional
integration model proposed by others given their complicated
bilateral relations as well as each country’s peculiar relations with
the U.S. The “battle of models” leaves ample space for power
politics, as there is little doubt “the prevailing great powers at this
historical moment are keen to use legal rules and institutions to
advance their interests and institutionalize their power,”21 both
regionally and globally. Thus, Asian regionalism is one of the best
examples through which one can investigate “the role of law in
shaping international politics,” “the role of politics in shaping
international law,”22 and the possibility of using international
economic law to limit injurious power politics.
This Article looks at the interactions of power politics and
international economic law in the development of trade
regionalism in Asia in the context of U.S.-China trade relations. It
argues that the process of regional economic integration in Asia
has been rather slow because of the politicization of Asia
regionalism by power rivalries. China’s initial regional integration
initiatives apparently ignored the U.S., which has always been an
indispensable part of the economic processes in Asia. The U.S.led TPP was allegedly designed to exclude China, the largest
economy in Asia. On the other hand, the TPP also spurred the
effects of competitive liberalization, pushing China to deepen its
economic reform domestically and engage its trading partners on
20

Joel Trachtman, International Trade: Regionalism, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 151, 151-52 (Andrew T.
Guzman & Alan O. Sykes eds., 2007).
21
A.M. Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, in
L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE [THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW] RECUEIL DES COURS 285 (2000) [COLLECTED COURSES
285 (2000)] 199 (2001).
22
Id. at 198.
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friendlier terms at regional and international levels. Further, the
demise of the TPP does not also mean the death of its cutting-edge
rules. Many of those rules are likely to be incorporated into other
new generations of FTAs or even the multilateral trading system if
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is upgraded to a second
version. Consequently, China must prepare itself for meeting the
high-standards of TPP-style agreements at some point in the future.
It is further argued that U.S.’ withdrawal from the TPP offers a
golden opportunity for Asian countries to establish a real Pan-Asia
free trade area through the negotiations of the RCEP, but in the
long run, regional integration in Asia should look beyond Asia to
include the economies of the American side of the Pacific for both
economic and strategic reasons.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I analyzes the
early stage of regionalism in East Asia, which started at the turn of
the 21st century, focusing on the China-Japan-U.S. rivalries in the
competition for regional integration models. Part II examines the
rise and demise of the TPP. Part III discusses the impacts of the
TPP on U.S.-China trade relations and Asian regionalism. Part IV
discusses the ongoing fundamental changes in U.S.-China trade
relations in the Post-TPP Trump Era. Lastly, Part V concludes
with some policy recommendations.
I.

CHINA’S EARLY PARTICIPATION AND THE CHINAJAPAN RIVALRY IN EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM

A. East Asian Regionalism and China’s Early Participation

As noted previously, regionalism in East Asia arguably
dates back to the 1992-established AFTA, although this was not a
serious beginning of regional integration as the AFTA has not even
realized meaningful free trade within ASEAN, let alone generating
impact at the Pan-Asian level.23 At the end of the 1990s, highly
trade-dependent countries in ASEAN, most notably Singapore,
began to look at FTAs in response to regional and global economic

23

See supra notes 12-15 & the accompanying text.
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events that included the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, the
collapse of the WTO’s meeting in Seattle, and China’s anticipated
accession to the WTO. Singapore and Japan established a Joint
Study Group to examine the feasibility of a bilateral FTA in
December 1999, which led to the signing of the Japan-Singapore
Economic Partnership Agreement (“JSEPA”) in January of 2002.24
The landmark regional integration initiative that kicked off
this wave of regionalism in Asia was the ASEAN-China FTA
(“ACFTA”), which was surprisingly proposed to ASEAN
countries by the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at the ASEANChina Summit in November of 2000.25 An expert group was
quickly formed to examine the feasibility of such a FTA, and
negotiations commenced in 2001.26 In November of 2002, China
and ASEAN countries were able to sign a Framework Agreement
for the ACFTA.27 The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, which is
based on a range of agreements between China and ASEAN on
trade in goods, services, investments, and other matters, came into
being on January 1, 2010, as the world’s biggest regional trade
deal measured by population and third largest by nominal GDP.28
Arguably, it was the ACFTA that triggered the new wave
of Pan-East Asian regionalism. China was the first country that
entered FTA relations with ASEAN. The ACFTA set the
framework and precedent for the FTAs that ASEAN signed with
24

See Press Release, Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Entry into
Force of the Agreement Between Japan and Singapore for a New Age Economic
Partnership (Oct. 31, 2002) (on file with the Singapore Ministry of Foreign
Affairs).
25
See Wang, supra note 16, at 124.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Andrew Walker, China and Asean free trade deal begins, BBC (Jan. 1,
2010, 12:33 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8436772.stm; see
generally Mohamed Aslam, The Impact of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
Agreement on ASEAN’s Manufacturing Industry, INT’L J. CHINA STUD., Apr.
2012, at 43; see generally SARAH Y. TONG & CATHERINE CHONG SIEW KENG,
CHINA-ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA IN 2010: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE (E.
Asian Inst. of Nat’l Univ. of Sing. ed., 2010).
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Korea in 2007, Japan in 2008, and Australia, New Zealand, and
India in 2009.29 In Asia, China, Japan, and Korea were newcomers
to regionalism, but the ASEAN+1 FTAs signed by them show that
“the three major East Asian countries have undergone a strategic
policy change from favoring the multilateral approach for global
free trade to actively participating in regional grouping in order to
regain their growth momentum after the [Asian Financial
Crisis]”.30 In tandem with pursuing the ACFTA, by 2010, the
number of FTAs China concluded totaled ten, with economies like
Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Hong Kong,
Macau, Taiwan, and Costa Rica.31
B. Politicized East Asian Regionalism: China-Japan Rivalry for Regional
Leadership

From the very beginning of this regional economic
integration wave, Asian countries were struggling with identifying
the geographic coverage of the economic regionalism, out of,
however, mainly geopolitical concerns. Several regional grouping
ideas were proposed but favored by different major powers in the
region. China initially indicated its willingness to negotiate a
trilateral FTA among China, Japan, and South Korea.32 The
concern for strong domestic opposition within the three Northeast
countries led them to agree that ASEAN was the ideal center to
hold East Asia together, which led to the idea of an ASEAN+3
model of regionalism.33 The ASEAN+3 FTA was officially

In the case of the ASEAN-Japan FTA, it was noted that “[p]rompted
by the China + ASEAN framework agreement, Tokyo followed suit.” See
Khairy Tourk, The Political Economy of East Asian Economic Integration, 15 J.
ASIAN ECON. 843, 857 (2004).
30
Jong-Wha Lee & Innwon Park, Free Trade Areas in East Asia:
Discriminatory or Non-discriminatory?, 28 WORLD ECON. 21, 23 (2005).
31
See Jiangyu Wang, China and East Asian Regionalism, 17 EUR. L. J.
611, 613 (2011).
32
Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 17, at 501.
33
Id. n.9 (indicating that Japan was “cautious about [a China-JapanKorea FTA] at this stage” officially because Japan wanted China to demonstrate
its compliance with its WTO obligations).
29
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proposed by China,34 and favored by South Korea and ASEAN, at
least initially.35
The ASEAN+3 model of regional cooperation commenced
when China, Japan, and South Korea were invited to the informal
ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in December of 1997 amid the Asian
Financial Crisis.36 Since then, numerous inter-governmental
initiatives were developed under the umbrella of ASEAN+3,
including the rather successful regional financial cooperation in
Asia that produced the Chiang Mai Initiative, which is Asia’s only
regional liquidity support arrangement, the regional economic
surveillance process, and the Asian bond market.37 It was also the
model envisaged by the East Asian Vision Group in its 2001
report, which recommended the establishment of an East Asian
Free Trade Area (“EAFTA”) embracing the ASEAN+3 grouping.38
China has been a firm supporter of the EAFTA and East
Asia’s regional integration, on the condition, however, that it is

34

Id.
Tourk, supra note 29, at 858. In January 2018, China has concluded
16 FTAs and is engaging in negotiations for 11 other FTAs. See CHINA FTA
NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 23,
2018).
36
Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, ASEAN+3 Or ASEAN+6:
Which Way Forward? 6 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Discussion Paper No. 77,
2007), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156716/adbi-dp77.pdf.
37
Id.
38
EAST ASIAN VISION GROUP, TOWARDS AN EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY:
REGION
OF
PEACE,
PROSPERITY
AND
PROGRESS
3
(2001),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf.
35
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based on the ASEAN+3 model.39 With its rapidly growing
economic might, China seemed to be confident that a “10+3” FTA
would eventually run in China’s favor and strengthen China’s
dominance in the region, even though Japan and Korea were
economically much more developed than China.40 China’s
enthusiasm for this model was, however, well received by
ASEAN, and was written into a Joint Declaration signed by the
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the heads of the ten ASEAN
governments in October of 2003, based on which, China and
ASEAN agreed to “[m]ake the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism as
the main channel to move forward cooperation and regional
economic integration in East Asia as a whole so as to promote

39

See ZHANG YUNLING, CHINA AND ASIAN REGIONALISM 8 (2010)
(indicating “China takes ‘10+3’ . . . as the core course for EAC [East Asian
Community]”); see also 10+3 Hézuò 20 Zhōunián: Mài Xiàng Dōngyà Jīngjì
Gòngtóngtǐ, Wàijiāo Bù Huíyīng (10+3合作20周年：迈向东亚经济共同体，
外交部回应) [The 20th Anniversary of the 10+3 (ASEAN+3) Cooperation:
Comment of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Path to East Asian
Community],
CANKAOXIAOXI.COM
(June
25,
2017),
http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/china/20170625/2145968.shtml (indicating that
“the ‘10+3’ model is the main avenue for East Asian cooperation, and the main
platform for establishing an East Asian regional economic community” and that
“China has always attached high degree of importance to and always
enthusiastically supported and participated in the ‘10+3’ model of cooperation”).
40
See Wáng Jiāngyǔ (王江雨) [Wang Jiangyu], Yàzhōu Jīng Jǐ Yītǐ
Huà de Géjú, Luàn Jú Héjiě Jú (亚洲经济一体化的格局、乱局和解局) [Asian
Economic Integration: State of Affairs, Messy Situation, and Solutions], CAIJING
MAGAZINE
(Nov.
28,
2015),
http://comments.caijing.com.cn/20151128/4020687.shtml (indicating that China
believed this model was in its best interest because (1) this model is relatively
smaller in size than other models and as such is more manageable and less risky;
(2) it can exclude suspicious countries such as India and Australia; and (3)
China is confident that it is only a matter of time before it will inevitably play a
dominate role in this region as its economic and comprehensive powers continue
to grow).
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sustainable development and common prosperity there.”41 Ever
since, Chinese delegates have tried hard to sell the ASEAN+3
model to other East Asian countries.42
Japan initially supported the idea of ASEAN+3, but quickly
backed down from it.43 Instead, Japan proposed a bigger regional
deal, or the ASEAN+6 grouping, which converts ASEAN+3 to a
larger trade block to include Australia, New Zealand, and India.44
The China-Japan rivalry appeared to be more visible in 2004 and
2005. ASEAN leaders, through a suggestion of the East Asian
Vision Group, agreed in November of 2004 to convene an East
Asian Summit (“EAS”). The first EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur
on December 14, 2005.45 Arguments about who to invite between
China and Japan preceded the Summit. “China favored a guest list
limited to ASEAN+3. Japan, seeking counterweights to China’s
influence, argued successfully for Australia, India, and New
Zealand to be included.”46 The EAS has since become a pan-Asia
forum for the sixteen countries, known as the ASEAN+6 forum.47
41

Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Joint Declaration of
The Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
and the People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity (May 11, 2012), http://asean.org/?static_post=external-relationschina-joint-declaration-of-the-heads-of-stategovernment-of-the-association-ofsoutheast-asian-nations-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china-on-strategicpartnership-for-peace-and-prosp.
42
See, e.g., Zhōngguó Zhīchí Dōngméng Zhǔdǎo “10+3” Jīngjì Hézuò
(中国支持东盟主导‘10+3’经济合作) [China Supports ASEAN Playing the
Leading Role in the “10+3” Model of Economic Cooperation], SINA (Aug. 25,
2006), http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2006-08-25/09199847099s.shtml [hereinafter
China Supports 10+3].
43
Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja noted Japan’s cautious
attitude towards the ASEAN+3 FTA proposed by China: “[Japan’s] official
view is that, before negotiating an FTA/EPA, China must clearly demonstrate
that compliance with all the commitments made in WTO accession
negotiations.” See Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 17, at 501.
44
Id.
45
POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 96-97; see also Masahiro Kawai, Evolving Economic
Architecture in East Asia 22 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Discussion Paper No. 84,
2007), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156723/adbi-dp84.pdf.
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No agreement, however, was reached to accommodate Russia’s
membership in the EAS, albeit Russia’s request was supported by
China and India.48
Obviously, Australia, New Zealand, and India were brought
into the EAS to check the growing influence of China, despite
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao’s call that East Asian regionalism
should be “led by the East Asian countries.”49 In that sense, the
first EAS “can be seen as a significant setback for Chinese
diplomacy.”50 On the other hand, China’s lack of interest in
participating in negotiations for an ASEAN+6 based
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (“CEPEA”),
proposed by Japan in 2006 as a counter-proposal to China’s idea of
an ASEAN+3 FTA, was one of the main reasons that the
ASEAN+6 regionalism made little progress between 2007 and
2009.51 At that time, the politicization of regionalism turned
economic integration in Asia into word games. “It is now
understood that the core of East Asian cooperation lies in ASEAN
as the ‘driving force,’ with ASEAN+3 as the ‘main vehicle’ for the
realization of an eventual East Asian economic community, with
the EAS as ‘an integral part of the overall evolving regional
architecture.’”52 In other words, regional economic integration
conducted by Asians themselves stalled at that time, thanks to the
lack of East Asia’s indigenous leadership because of the ChinaJapan rivalry.
48

POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95.
Philip Bowring, Opinion, Towards an “Asian Union,” N.Y. TIMES
(Jun. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/18/opinion/philip-bowringtoward-an-asian-union.html.
50
Id.
51
As noted previously, China always believed that ASEAN+3 (10+3)
was the major channel to the realization of regional economic integration in
Asia, and was suspicious of accepting Non-East Asian members, such as
Australia and India into the regional integration circle in East Asia. See supra
notes 34-37 & the accompanying texts. On the other hand, it was also pointed
out that other members’ lack of interest in ASEAN+6 was because of “Japanese
reluctance to open its market to sensitive imports.” See POMFRET, supra note 14,
at 97.
52
Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 17, at 509.
49

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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C. The Role of the United States in Asian Regionalism: Indifference,
Exclusion and Responses

There were generally two concerns about Asian
regionalism when it started in the 2000s. The first was the
conventional unease with regionalism’s negative impact on global
trade liberalization, much discussed in the literature on
regionalism.53 The second is related to U.S.’ involvement in Asia.
Asia’s new regionalist proposals, be it an ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6
FTA, share a common feature: the exclusion of the U.S., which is
historically and practically an Asian power. In the China-Japan
rivalry, Asian countries once debated about whether to invite
Australia, New Zealand, India, and even Russia to the club, but the
U.S. was not considered to be part of the economic integration
process in Asia. As Fravel and Samuels observed in 2005, “most
of the partnerships exclude the United States altogether—and more
are being formed every year.”54
The lack of participation by the U.S. was nevertheless
largely self-chosen exclusion. In part because it was preoccupied
with the War on Terror, and in part because it was not interested in
the shallow integration projects in Asia, the U.S. “showed less
concern about East Asian regionalism in the early 2000s than it
had in the 1990s.”55 As observed by Takashi Terada:
The United States had never been
interested in participating in any East
Asia (as opposed to Asia-Pacific)
regional institution until Barack
Obama assumed office in January
2009 and subsequently declared
himself “America’s first Pacific
53

See NAOKO MUNAKATA, TRANSFORMING EAST ASIA:
THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 15 (2006).
54
Taylor Fravel & Richard J. Samuels, The United States as an Asian
Power: Realism or Conceit?, MIT CTR. INT’L STUD.: AUDIT OF CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM 2 (2005).
55
POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95.
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President.” One of the first steps the
Obama administration took in regard
to regional engagement was to sign
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia
(TAC) in July 2009, fulfilling the
only precondition for official EAS
participation that had not previously
been met by the United States.56
However, with China’s rapid rise in the region, America’s
original indifference gradually turned into anxiety and even “fear
of exclusion,” particularly with respect to the escalation of the
ASEAN+3 framework to the level of a summit like the EAS. As
Naoko Munakata noted:
Another of Washington’s concerns,
expressed in mid-2004, was that the
idea of a separate East Asia summit
circulating at the ASEAN+3
meetings was designed to enhance
the influence of China. Because the
decision to hold the summit was
made somewhat abruptly and
difference of its purpose and that of
the existing ASEAN+3 leaders
meeting was not made clear, some
suspected that the true aim might be
to exclude US influence in the region
and China might use it as a forum to
dominate the region.57
Responses from the U.S. are threefold. First, senior
officials signified warnings to Asian countries, especially
56

Takashi Terada, ASEAN Plus Three: becoming more like a normal
regionalism?, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN REGIONALISM 364, 371
(Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs eds., Routledge 2012).
57
MUNAKATA, supra note 53, at 16.
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American allies in the region, that regional integration in Asia was
marching toward an unwelcome direction without U.S.’
involvement. Beginning in 2004, U.S. senior officials expressed
concerns about Asia’s regional progress without American
involvement.58 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in August of
2004 in Tokyo, urged Asian countries not to participate in Asiaonly forums “in a way that undercuts the very, very fine and strong
relations that the United States has with each and every one of our
friends in Asia.”59 It was suspected in the U.S. that China’s goal
for promoting regionalism was to exclude America from Asia.
Richard Armitage, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, warned
before the first EAS that such a forum “would exclude the United
States, which China was particularly enthusiastic about.”60
Second, in light of the view that a China-dominated
regionalization project might have excluded the U.S. as the
objective, the U.S. lobbied Japan, its most important ally in Asia,
not to endorse China’s proposal for an EAS, which was part of the
reason Japan withdrew its initial backing of the ASEAN+3
model.61 Still in favor of Asian regionalism, Japan counterproposed the ASEAN+6 framework to introduce Australia, India,
and New Zealand into the circle of Asian countries to dilute
Chinese influence.62 More significantly, “a greater weight of
democratic countries with market-based economies might make
the grouping more acceptable to the USA.”63
Third, the U.S. endorsed, albeit a bit unofficially, the idea
of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (“FTAAP”) under the
umbrella of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”), an
58
Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning Staff at the State
Department, remarked in November of 2004 in Tokyo that “while we encourage
greater integration, greater economic development, greater dialogue among all
the countries of this region, we don’t want to be excluded from that
conversation.” Fravel & Samuels, supra note 54, at 2.
59
MUNAKATA, supra note 53, at 191.
60
Id.
61
POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95.
62
Id. at 96.
63
Id.
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ideal so inclusive that most of the countries along the Pacific Rim
would be embraced. The APEC, spear-headed by Japan and
Australia, had its first meeting in November of 1989, and it was
attended by the finance ministers from twelve Asian-Pacific states
with the clear absence of China (China later became an APEC
member in 1991).64 The idea of the FTAAP has its origin in a
recommendation of the APEC Business Advisory Council
(“ABAC”) in a study report of an Asia-Pacific-wide FTA,
commissioned by APEC leaders in 2004 and 2005.65 APEC
leaders were initially unenthusiastic about the FTAAP, but the U.S.
changed its attitude in 2006 and began to promote the FTAAP as a
base agreement for the vast Asia Pacific region.66
According to Fred Bergsten, the former Director of the
Peterson Institute for International Economics, the former
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs of the U.S. Treasury,
and Chairman of APEC’s Eminent Persons Group for trade policy
strategy, an FTAAP would be a “Plan B” to get world trade policy
back on track in view of the ailing Doha Round negotiations of the
WTO.67 Further, given the disturbance caused by the explosion of
FTAs in Asia and elsewhere, “one of the key advantages of the
FTAAP is that it would sweep together the smaller deals already in
place and head off those that will otherwise ensue.”68

64

See Nick Bisley, APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, in
MARK BEESON & RICHARD STUBBS, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN
REGIONALISM 350, 351-53 (2012).
65
Robert Scollay, Professor of Economics, Presentation at ISEAS
Seminar: A Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP)? Rational and
Feasibility (Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.pecc.org/resources/publications/tradeand-investment/2028-a-free-trade-area-of-the-asia-pacific-ftaap-rationale-andfeasibility/file; see also Fred Bergsten, Toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia
Pacific, PB07-2 PETER G. PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. 1 (2007),
https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb07-2.pdf.
66
Id.
67
Fred Bergsten, Plan B for world trade, FIN. TIMES (Aug.15, 2006),
https://www.ft.com/content/390d8cec-2c82-11db-9845-0000779e2340.
68
Id.
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More significantly, the FTAAP would successfully address
the exclusion of the U.S. from Asian regionalism and alleviate the
play of geopolitics by the major powers in the region through
trans-Pacific economic cooperation. For this, Bergsten lucidly
wrote:
[An] FTAAP would embed these
Asia-only arrangements in a broader
Asia-Pacific framework. It would
prevent the creation of a new
division across the Pacific, with its
adverse security as well as economic
consequences for relations between
east Asia and the US. The US and
China would be the natural leaders of
an FTAAP process and could
simultaneously
improve
the
prospects for resolving their bilateral
trade tensions through such a
regional framework.69
Arguably, the FTAAP proposal by the U.S. in 2006-2007
offered an opportunity for China, Japan, and other Asia economies
to welcome the U.S. to the newly-developed Asian regionalism.
After all, even from a realist perspective, the U.S. has been the defacto leading power in Asia Pacific, as well as one of the largest
markets and sources of investment and technology for many Asian
countries. It has also been the only guarantor of peace and stability
in Asia. However, Asian regionalism’s existing players, including
both China and Japan, did not show much enthusiasm in it.70
69

Id.
China expressed skepticism about the FTAAP in Hanoi in 2006,
citing two concerns that included the adverse effect on the WTO’s Doha Round
and a delay in implementing the APEC’s Bogor goals. It was however noted that
China’s main concerns lie in promoting its own bilateral and regional deals
including the ASEAN+3 FTA. Japan agreed to support the FTAAP along with
its own ASEAN+6 deal, indicating its preference lied in the ASEAN+6 model.
See Bergsten, supra note 65, at 1-3.
70
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China continued to voice its firm commitment to the ASEAN+3 or
“10+3” style of regional economic integration in Asia for years
after the FTAAP proposal was circulated.71 A year later, the U.S.
activated its mega-FTA project, the TPP, which has aroused more
intensified power politics in Asia and essentially divided Asia and
stalled its indigenous economic integration process. But even in
2010, when the TPP negotiations already entered a substantive
stage, Chinese officials were still trying hard to sell the ASEAN+3
FTA idea to other Asian governments. Yi Xiaozhun, China’s
Deputy Commerce Minister, indicated in an ASEAN media
conference that the “conditions are virtually mature” for an
ASEAN+3 free trade area:
Since 2005, the studies for a “10+3”
FTA have been conducted for five
years. . . . I think the conditions are
ripe for accelerating regional
integration in East Asia. We should .
. . firmly make the East Asian
Community the long-term goal of the
“10+3” cooperation, support the core
leadership role of the ASEAN in the
“10+3” and East Asia integration
process.
All the governments
concerned should fully use the
“10+3” as the main vehicle to
steadfastly build the “10+3” FTA in
accordance with the research results
and the recommendations about the
“10+3” FTA, which will eventually
be followed by the full realization of
East Asian economic integration if
See Zhōngguó Zhīchí Dōngméng “10+3” Jīngjì Hézuò Jìnchéng（中
国支持东盟“10+3”经济合作进程） [PRC Ministry of Commerce: China
71

Supports the ‘10+3’ Model of Economic Integration Led by ASEAN], CHINA
NET
(Aug.
25,
2006),
http://www.china.com.cn/economic/zhuanti/chinaeast15/txt/200608/25/content_7256804.htm.
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we proceed based on the principles
of “doing the easies things first” and
“doing things gradually.” . . . We
stick to open regionalism . . . and
will not form a self-insolated or
exclusive group. . . . However, we
will expand the scope of regional
integration in Asia only after we can
make substantial progress on the
“10+3” FTA.72
This telling statement, in stark contrast with the words of
Bergsten, showed that China was still unwavering in promoting an
ASEAN+3 FTA, apparently excluding the official presence of the
U.S. in the process, despite the signs that Asian regionalism was
already being shaped—largely by the TPP—in a direction not in
China’s favor in the way ahead.
II.

THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE TPP

When the TPP negotiations were concluded and the final
text was reached by the twelve Pacific Rim states on October 5,
2015, it was immediately recognized as the “largest regional trade
accord in history,” with its members representing roughly 40
percent of global GDP and one-third of world trade.73 Mighty as it
Jiāqiáng Qūyù Hézuò, Gòng Chuàng Měihǎo Wèilái-yì Xiǎo Zhǔn
Fù Bùzhǎng Zài Dì Sān Jiè 10+3 Méitǐ Hézuò Yántǎo Huì Shàng de Jiǎnghuà (
加强区域合作，共创美好未来-易小准副部长在第三届10+3媒体合作研讨
会上的讲话) [Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Creating a Bright
Future for All of Us – Speech of Deputy Minister of Ministry of Commerce at the
Third Workshop on ‘10+3’ Media Cooperation], MINISTRY OF COM.: PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA
(May
22,
2017),
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/af/ak/201004/20100406881614.shtml.
73
Kevin Granville, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Accord
Explained, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
5,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/international/the-trans-pacificpartnership-trade-deal-explained.html?_r=0. The twelve countries are Australia,
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore,
United States, and Vietnam. Id.
72
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might have sounded, the TPP has a rather humble origin. Known
originally as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, it
was conceived by three small economies—Singapore, New
Zealand, and Chile—in 2003, and concluded by these three
countries together with Brunei in 2006 when it was called the
Pacific 4, or P-4 agreement.74
The U.S. entered talks with the P-4 countries on
liberalization in financial services and investment in March of
2008.75 President George W. Bush, not long after his call for
“serious consideration” to the FTAAP,76 notified Congress of his
intention to participate in TPP negotiations in November and
persuaded Australia, Peru, and Vietnam to join with the U.S. in
December of 2008.77 The Obama Administration waited until
November of 2009 to commit the U.S. to continue with TPP
negotiations “with the goal of reshaping a regional agreement that
will have broad-based membership and high standards worthy of a
21st-century trade agreement.”78 The nine negotiating parties, led
by the U.S., jointly issued a statement at the 2011 APEC Leaders
Meeting in Honolulu to announce their vision to make the TPP “a
comprehensive, next generation regional agreement that liberalizes
trade and investment and addresses new and traditional issues and
21st-century challenges.”79 With the accession of Canada, Mexico,
and Japan in the following years, the total number of TPP members
reached twelve in 2013.80
The final text of the TPP agreement, signed by the twelve
parties in February of 2016, comprises of 30 chapters, which deal
not only with traditional trade issues, such as market access for
goods, rules of origin, customs administration, trade remedies,
74
IAN FERGUSSON, MARK MCMINIMY & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP)
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2015).
75
Id.
76
Bergsten, supra note 65, at 1.
77
FERGUSSON, MCMINIMY & WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 1.
78
Id. at 3.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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technical barriers, investment, services, and intellectual property
rights (“IPRs”), but also cutting-edge issues such as e-commerce,
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), regulatory coherence,
enforceable labor and environmental rules, as well as “other policy
areas that are less obviously associated with trade or trade
barriers.”81
It is helpful to briefly summarize the content of the TPP
agreement here. On market access, approximately 99 percent of
the tariff lines for trade in goods will be duty-free once the TPP
would take effect.82 The liberalization on trade in services is, if not
revolutionary, at least tremendous, not only because it follows the
“negative-list” approach. Exceptionally, it generally prohibits the
requirement for local presence of service suppliers.83
On
investment, it establishes strong protection for investors based on
the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, and creates an Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) for private investors to seek
arbitration against host states.84 On intellectual property rights, the
level of protection goes significantly beyond the current WTO
provisions in Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) Agreement (e.g., copyright increased from 50 years to
70 years).85 On digital trade and e-commerce, TPP members are
prohibited from setting up barriers to block cross-border flows of
data over the internet.86 The chapter on State-Owned Enterprises
(“SOE”) offers an operational definition on SOE as well as
disciplines
regarding
transparency,
non-discrimination,
81

Daniel Ikenson et al., Should Free Traders Support the Trans-Pacific
Partnership? An Assessment of America’s Largest Preferential Trade
Agreement 2 (Cato Inst., Working Paper No. 39, 2016).
82
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement ch. 1, Feb. 4, 2016, Off. of
U.S. Trade Representative., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter TPP].
83
Id.
84
Id. ch. 9.
85
Id. ch. 18; see also Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
86
TPP, supra note 82, ch. 14.
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commercial consideration, and general prohibition on
government’s commercial assistance.87
TPP’s labor and
environmental rules require the adoption and enforcement of laws
in line with relevant international labor standards and
environmental agreements.88 Finally, the TPP establishes a
simpler institutional structure that includes a dispute settlement
mechanism with only one panel process to reach the final award.89
However comprehensive and significant it may be, the
U.S.-led TPP is now dead as a result of President Trump’s
executive order to pull the U.S. out of it. The Presidential Order
indicated the rationale for abandoning the TPP was because the
agreement did not meet “the intention of [the Trump]
Administration to deal directly with individual countries on a oneon-one (or bilateral) basis in negotiating future trade deals.”90 The
United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) was directed “to
withdraw the United States as a signatory to the [TPP], to
permanently withdraw the United States from TPP negotiations,
and to begin pursuing, wherever possible, bilateral trade
negotiations to promote American industry, protect American
workers, and raise American wages.”91 However, this move was
interpreted by The New York Times as President Trump’s signal
“that he would not follow old rules, effectively disregarding
longstanding Republican orthodoxy that expanding global trade
was good for the world and America – and that the United States
should help write the rules of international commerce.”92

87

Id. ch. 17.
Id. ch. 19; id. ch. 20.
89
Id. ch. 28.
90
Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, Donald J.
Trump, President of the United States, The White House (Jan. 23, 2017) (on file
with WhiteHouse.gov).
91
Id.
92
Peter Baker, Trump abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s
Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-tradenafta.html?_r=0.
88
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III.

IMPACTS OF THE TPP ON U.S.-CHINA TRADE
RELATIONS AND ASIAN REGIONALISM

A. Containing China Through a Trade Agreement?

Not surprisingly, news on the conclusion of the TPP
negotiations triggered extensive media coverage and heated
debates worldwide, to some degree because China was excluded
from the mega-regional deal. This author has observed elsewhere
how the TPP is perceived within China:
Among Chinese experts, there exist
various opinions in regard to both the
perceived effects of the TPP
agreement itself and the process by
which parties to the agreement were
chosen. Some believe that the TPP
is a strategic exercise by the United
States to try to “contain” China’s rise
in economic power and geopolitical
influence. Others have concerns as
to whether the TPP represents a
threat to the position of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) as the
standard-bearer of global trade rules.
Still some view the agreement
optimistically, believing this could
be a stimulus for China’s further
integration
into
the
world
economy.93
Media in the U.S. has not been shy about the strategic nature of the
TPP. In criticizing presidential candidate Trump’s trade policy,
The New York Times lamented:

93

Jiangyu Wang, Decoding the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Will the
U.S.-led trade agreement pose a threat to China?, BEIJING REV. (May 20,
2017), http://www.bjreview.com/World/201510/t20151026_800041255.html.
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The agreement, known as TPP, was
intended to play a strategic role in
American diplomacy. It was the
economic linchpin of Mr. Obama’s
effort to reaffirm the nation’s role as
a Pacific power and counter the
rising influence of China, which was
not part of the negotiations.
Washington’s abandonment of the
pact is widely seen in the region as a
blow to American prestige and an
opening for China to negotiate trade
rules, win friends among Asian
nations
and
assert
regional
94
leadership.
There are, however, two ways to look at the TPP insofar as
its impact on China is concerned. As noted, many, if not most,
Chinese and international commentators believed that the TPP was
used by the U.S. to contain China.95 For those observers, the TPP
was simply a geopolitical tool to limit China’s influence in the
region for the following reasons.
First, China’s absence from the TPP as the largest economy
in Asia and second largest economy in the world would make the
trade agreement economically much less sensible. Clearly, a
regional-level FTA would be much more meaningful economically
by including China. Studies on the economic effects of the TPP by
Petri, Plummer, and Zhai suggested that “the greatest economic
benefits were associated with agreements that spanned China and
94

A Retreat from TPP Would Empower China, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/opinion/a-retreat-from-tpp-wouldempower-china.html.
95
See, e.g., Cai Penghong, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Chinese
Perspective, PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION COUNCIL (Oct. 4, 2011),
https://www.pecc.org/resources/trade-and-investment-1/1752-the-trans-pacificpartnership-a-chinese-perspective-ppt/file (stating that “[i]t seems that U.S. is
using the TPP as a tool as part of its Asia Pacific Strategy to contain China”).
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the United States.”96 For instance, it was estimated—calculated
through an advanced computable general equilibrium (“CGE”)
model—that “expanding the TPP from 12 to 17 members [to
include China, Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand]
would triple global benefits from 285 to 893 billion in U.S. dollars
in 2025.”97 Specifically:
1. Adding China to a 16-member
TPP increases global benefits
from $451 to $1,908 billion per
year, or from 0.4 percent to 1.8
percent of world GDP. China’s
benefits account for 2/3 of these
changes, as Chinese gains
increase from -$82 billion under
the TPP16 (suggesting trade
diversion losses) to $809 billion.
These and other values are for
2025 relative to baseline
projections, expressed in billions
of 2007 dollars.
2. Every TPP16 economy benefits
from adding China. The gains
are roughly three times as high as
under the TPP16 for Australia
and the Americas. Gains more
than double for Japan, Korea and
Singapore. Smaller increments
are estimated for Asian middleincome economies which are
more competitive with China.
Substantial additional losses are
calculated for Taiwan, Hong
96

Peter Petri, Michael Plummer & Fan Zhai, The TPP, China, And
FTAAP, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 78, 81
(Tang Guoqiang & Peter A. Petri eds., E.-W. Ctr. 2014).
97
Id. at 83.
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Kong and the ROW, economies
excluded from the TPP17. 98
Hence, one would be curious about how the TPP members were
selected. If it was about the members’ stage of economic
development on the presumption that the higher the members’
developmental level, the more likely for them to conclude a highquality FTA, then China was obviously better positioned in this
regard than some other TPP members, such as Vietnam and,
arguably, Malaysia. On this basis, the fact that China was
excluded must find its answer in geopolitics, not common
economic welfare for the region.
Second, the numerous statements, speeches, commentaries,
and analyses from official and private sources in the U.S.
overwhelmingly suggested that the TPP represented a strategic
move to counterbalance and restrict China’s rising influence in
Asia. Aston Carter, Obama’s Defense Secretary, famously
remarked that “in terms of our rebalance in the broadest sense,
passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft,” because
“[i]t would deepen our alliance and partnerships abroad and
underscore our lasting commitment to the Asia-Pacific. And it
would help us promote a global order that reflects both our
interests and our values.”99 President Barak Obama also constantly
maintained that the TPP dealt a way for the U.S. to “write the

98
Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer & Fan Zhai, China in the TPP,
ASIAN-PACIFIC TRADE (Feb. 4, 2014), http://asiapacifictrade.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/Adding-China-to-the-TPP-4feb14.pdf.
99
Ash Carter, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Remarks on the Next Phase of the
U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, Speech Before the McCain Institute,
Arizona State University (April 6, 2015) (transcript available on the Dep’t of
Def.
website),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/SpeechView/Article/606660/remarks-on-the-next-phase-of-the-us-rebalance-to-theasia-pacific-mccain-instit/.
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rules” for Asia-Pacific and reassert primacy over China.100 In an
op-ed he wrote for The Washington Post urging U.S. Congress to
pass the TPP, President Obama emphasized the geopolitical nature
of the agreement as follows: “The world has changed. The rules
are changing with it. The United States, not countries like China,
should write them. Let’s seize this opportunity, pass the TransPacific Partnership and make sure America isn’t holding the bag,
but holding the pen.”101
The logic and need to hedge against China with the TPP,
from the perspective of many American politicians and
commentators, would sound simple and powerful. Since the TPP
is an agreement to check China’s power, its failure would mean a
huge defeat to the U.S. and benefit only China, America’s primary
geopolitical competitor.102 It was imagined that, without the TPP,
Beijing would dictate policy and make rules for Asia.103
Indubitably, the views based on this logic have been made
understood (or misunderstood) in China and planted seeds of
mistrust as to the U.S.’ intention behind the TPP.

Jerry Seib, Obama: If We Don’t Write Trade Rules, China Will,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/video/obama-if-we-dontwrite-trade-rules-china-will/2E2F928C-1747-435D-9CABEB3346FDEEB9.html; see also Ikenson, supra note 81; David Francis, Obama:
Failure to Pass TPP Benefits Beijing, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/16/obama-failure-to-pass-tpp-benefitsbeijing/; Nathan Vanderklippe, TPP Deal a Way for U.S. to Reassert Primacy
over
China,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Oct.
5,
2015),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tpp-deal-a-way-for-us-toreassert-primacy-over-china/article26660167/.
101
Barack Obama, President Obama: The TPP would let America, not
China, lead the way on global trade, WASH. POST. (May 2, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-letamerica-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd011e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.015159983ea4.
102
Roger Cohen, If the Trans-Pacific Partnership Crumbles, China
Wins,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
2,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/the-right-asian-deal-trans-pacificpartnership.html (“If T.P.P. falls apart, China wins. It’s as simple as that.”).
103
Id.
100
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One may argue that the above statements and speeches
should be read with contextual considerations. After all, they
might only carry sensitivity for an American audience in the
context of American politics. For example, President Obama,
because of the significant opposition he faced domestically, might
find naming China as a convenient strategic move to win over
American voters, especially when Donald Trump’s critique of
U.S.’ trade policy toward China garnered massive support in the
American public. This, arguably, did not necessarily mean the
Obama Administration sought to contain China with the TPP. This
argument, however, does run against the third reason why the TPP
is believed by many Chinese as a geopolitical tool against China,
which has much to do with the agreement’s rules. In today’s
international trade, China is well-positioned at the central place in
the global supply chains as a major manufacturing center, now
producing about one-quarter of global output, largely thanks to
China’s ability to match developing-world labor costs with worldclass infrastructures.104 Nevertheless, the TPP might aim to
deprive China of its position as a global production hub, or at least
undermine it. As pointed out by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, one of the key features of the TPP is its “regional
approach to commitments.”105 That is, the TPP was intended to
facilitate “the development of production and supply chains, and
seamless trade,” among others, implicitly within the areas
connected and covered by the TPP.106
The objective of establishing regional production and
supply chains within the TPP area was designed to be achieved, in
part, through a system of stringent rules of origin, which requires
that only “originating goods,” or goods genuinely produced by
TPP members, could receive the lower tariffs or other benefits in
104

The Future of Global Supply Chains: Insights from a CFR
Workshop,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(June
27,
2016),
https://www.cfr.org/report/future-global-supply-chains.
105
Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Summary of the TransPacific Partnership Agreement, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative (May 22,
2017) (on file with author).
106
Id.
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accordance with the TPP.107 Under the concept of cumulation,
TPP members would treat materials from one TPP member in the
same way they treat materials from any other TPP member when
these materials are used to make a TPP product.108 As noted by the
USTR, the “cumulation” rule “strengthens incentives for TPP
businesses to integrate production and supply chains within the
TPP region, making it more attractive to do business with
producers in the U.S. and other TPP countries than with producers
in other countries.”109
The threat to Chinese exports was especially vivid with
regard to textile trade, for which the TPP adopts a “yarn forward”
rule of origin, requiring the end product to use yarns and fabrics
from TPP countries in order to qualify for preferential treatment
under TPP.110 Currently in the American market, China and
Vietnam are the two largest sources of imports for garment and
footwear.111 Yet Vietnam’s textile industry heavily relies on
importing raw materials from China. In 2014, it imported 4 billion
in U.S. dollars worth of fabrics from China, about a half of its total
annual imports.112 The “yarn forward” rule, however, would
mandate Vietnam to cut back on imports from China, thus

107

Id.
Id.
109
TPP, supra note 82, ch. 3; Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures
Chapter Summary, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Rules-of-Origin-andOrigin-Procedures.pdf (last visited May 21, 2017).
110
Textiles and Apparel Chapter Summary, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
(last
visited
Mar.
25,
2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Textiles-andApparel.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2018); see TPP, supra note 82, ch. 4, art. 4.2.
111
See 2016 Nián Yuènán Zài Měiguó Chéngyī Jìnkǒu Shìchǎng de
Zhànyǒu Lǜ Shàngshēng (2016年越南在美国成衣进口市场的占有率上升)
[Vietnam’s Shares in US Garment and Footwear Market Increased in 2016],
SHANGHAI
INT’L
COTTON
EXCH.
(Mar.
7,
2017),
http://www.cottonsh.com/news!show.action?id=7b1f45e92ac54183a402b9bbb4
a4ecb3 (reporting that China’s market share was 41.5% and Vietnam’s was
12.45% in the garment and footwear markets in the U.S.).
112
Id.
108
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diverting Vietnam’s sourcing of yarns and fabrics from China to
TPP countries, hopefully the U.S. and Mexico.113
Some TPP rules, especially those concerning free flow of
information on the internet and establishment of independent trade
unions, challenge the authoritarian nature of China’s political
system on certain highly politically sensitive issues.
This
challenge, intentionally or unintentionally (from the American
perspective), creates barriers that prevent China from joining the
TPP in the capacity of an authoritarian state with socialist market
economy.114
113
Tom Wright & Mark Magnier, Fabric of a Trade Deal: U.S. Asks
Vietnam to Cut Out Chinese Textiles, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2015, 6:28 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fabric-of-a-trade-deal-u-s-asks-vietnam-to-cut-outchinese-textiles-1435125498.
114
For instance, the TPP’s “Electronic Commerce” Chapter requires a
TPP member to ensure free flow of the global information and data. See TPP,
supra note 82, ch. 14. “Each Party shall allow the cross-border transfer of
information by electronic means.” Id. ch. 14, art. 14.11. It also prohibits any
party to require business to locate computing facilities in its territory “as a
condition for conducting business in that territory,” among others. Id. ch. 14, art.
14.13. These requirements run directly against Chinese laws and regulations
such, as the PRC Cyber Security Law that took effect on June 1, 2017. See
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Wǎngluò Anquán Fǎ (中华人民共和国网络安
全法) [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017),
WWW.LAWINFOCHINA.COM [hereinafter PRC Cybersecurity Law]. China’s
notorious Great Firewall, an internet technological system of limiting access to
foreign websites, has been used to block foreign web domains or even particular
pages with websites which contain “harmful” foreign content from being
accessed by residents in China. See E.H., How does China censor the
Internet?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 22,
2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-china-censors-internet; The Great
Firewall: The art of concealment, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 6,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574631-chinesescreening-online-material-abroad-becoming-ever-more-sophisticated. Further,
Article 37 of the PRC Cyber Security Law, as a data-localization requirement,
compels the operators of “critical information infrastructure” to store
“individuals’ personal information or important data” within China. See PRC
Cybersecurity Law, supra note 114, art. 37. Clearly, these rules and policies are
contrary to the TPP.
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Finally, it is important to point out that perception is not
necessarily reality. What the above discussions have demonstrated
is that the TPP was perceived by many as a China-containment
tool. Containment may or may not work. Empirical evidence
about the containment policy adopted in other parts of the world
submits that this policy hardly works. For example, the U.S.
embargo on Cuba, which started in the 1960s to bar Americans
from trading with, investing in, or travelling to Cuba, has been
described as a “half-century of failure.”115 In December of 2014,
President Obama called for Congress to end the embargo,
admitting that, while this policy “has been rooted in the best of
intentions,” it “has had little effect.”116 With respect to the TPP, it
is certainly open to doubt how much it could do to affect the
Chinese economy. Furthermore, to the extent there is any
containment element in the TPP, it was a half-hearted policy since
the U.S. was pursuing collaboration on trade with China through
other channels while simultaneously excluding China from the
TPP. For instance, the U.S. and China engaged in formal
negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) almost in
tandem with the TPP negotiations.117
B. Competitive Liberalization to Push China to Adopt Higher
Standards?

A different perspective that looks at the positive side of
TPP’s impact on China asserts that the TPP can encourage
“competitive liberalization” in trade policy, which shall eventually
Daniel Griswold, Dir., Ctr. for Trade Pol’y Stud. at the Cato Inst.,
Four Decades of Failure: the U.S. Embargo against Cuba, Speech Before the
James A. Baker III Inst. Program (May 21, 2017) (transcript available on
www.cato.org).
116
Alan Rappeport, Obama Calls Cuba Embargo a Failure, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
17,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/politics/firstdraft/2014/12/17/obama-calls-cuba-embargo-a-failure/.
117
TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY 3 (Peterson Inst. Int’l
Econ. 2015), https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/briefings/piieb151.pdf (noting the talks for the U.S.-China BIT were launched in 2008 by the
U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao).
115
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drive China into the fair game of economic liberalization. The
concept of “competitive liberalization” denotes that free trade can
be pursued as aggressively as possible at all three levels—bilateral,
regional, and multilateral—simultaneously.118 Not only are all
three pursuits mutually reinforcing, they also induce and encourage
each other. Thus, “an FTA can encourage movement in WTO
negotiations, and vice versa.”119 Proponents argue that the TPP
would enable the U.S. to shape the directions of international trade
and investment at the following levels:
[1] Encouraging market opening and
economic reforms among TPP’s
current members, particularly in
emerging markets such as Malaysia
and Vietnam;
[2] Creating incentives for other
Asia-Pacific nations to follow suit, to
match the preferential access that
TPP members would gain in major
markets such as the United States
and Japan; and
[3] Addressing new trade barriers
through new trade rules and
disciplines, laying groundwork to
influence and potentially spur future
multilateral
or
plurilateral
negotiations at the WTO or future

118

See generally C. Fred Bergsten, Competitive Liberalization and
Global Free Trade: A Vision for the Early 21st Century (Inst. Int’l Econ.,
Working Paper No. 96-15, 1996), https://piie.com/publications/workingpapers/competitive-liberalization-and-global-free-trade-vision-early-21st.
119
Raj Bhala, Competitive Liberalization, Competitive Imperialism,
and Intellectual Property, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 77, 79 (2007).
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FTA negotiations, and update critical
gaps in existing trade rules. 120
Thus, it is argued that instead of being anything to contain China,
the TPP is simply a trade agreement to advance economic
liberalization at regional level. This argument goes by saying that
China is not actually excluded from the TPP. Rather, it is expected
to join the agreement after, of course, the fundamental rules and
principles are hammered out. Even President Obama made an
informal comment indicating that China could be open to
eventually joining the TPP.121
Responses from China suggested mixed feelings about the
TPP. As noted previously, on the one hand, viewed as an
indispensable part of the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia”
strategy, the TPP was received with widespread skepticism in
China.122 Certain Chinese foreign economic policies, including the
“FTA Strategy” and One Belt One Road initiative, appear to be

120

BROCK R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44361, THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 5 (2017).
121
See Kai Ryssdal, President Obama says China open to joining trade
partnership,
MARKETPLACE
(June
3,
2015,
9:55
AM),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lia6pFnwNqYJ:https://
www.marketplace.org/2015/06/03/world/president-obama-talks-trade/presidentobama-says-china-open-joining-trade-&num=1&strip=1&vwsrc=0. Discussing
China and the TPP in an interview with American business media Marketplace,
President Obama said: “[T]hey’ve already started putting out of feelers about the
possibilities of them participating at some point.” Id.
122
See Wang, supra note 93.
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have been strategic and geopolitics-driven.123 However, China’s
official response to the conclusion of the TPP deal appeared cool
and even neutral. A spokesperson from the PRC Ministry of
Commerce (“MOFCOM”) commented that “China always keeps
an open mind toward the construction of systems that are in
accordance with WTO rules and are helpful for promoting
economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.”124
More
significantly, China has embarked on economic reforms to
experiment with new legal and regulatory environments—possibly
due to pressure from the challenging rules of the TPP—to deal
with the new trade and investment issues through its newly
established Free Trade Zones (“FTZs”). The new FTZ measures,
some of which have already been codified into national laws and
regulations, include lowered or zero tariffs, pre-establishment
national treatment, “negative lists” for foreign investment, zeroregistered capital requirement, much simplified registration
123
As noted by the WTO, “the creation of [FTAs] cannot be fully
understood without considering the political context within which they are
formed.” See MARC BACCHETTA ET AL., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011: THE
WTO AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: FROM CO-EXISTENCE TO
COHERENCE 95 (2011). A World Bank report observed that “[regional
integration is good politics: it meets] politics needs, such as security or enhanced
bargaining power, and it satisfies influential lobbies.” See WORLD BANK, TRADE
BLOCS 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). On the motivations behind China’s FTA
approach, Jiangyu Wang has observed that “China’s [FTA] approach, as a
strategic movement, must be viewed in a larger context that embraces both
economic and geopolitical considerations, with the latter playing a relatively
more important role at this stage.” See Jiangyu Wang, supra note 16, at 129. See
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard & Colin Flint, The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk
Road Initiative, GEOPOLITICS, Apr. 2017, at 223 & Charlie Campbell / Khorgos,
Ports, Pipelines, and Geopolitics: China’s New Silk Road Is a Challenge for
Washington, TIME (Oct. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4992103/china-silk-roadbelt-xi-jinping-khorgos-kazakhstan-infrastructure/, for the strategic and
geopolitical dimensions of China’s One Belt One Road initiative.
124
Shannon Tiezzi, What Does China Think of the TPP?, THE
DIPLOMAT (Oct. 7, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/what-does-chinathink-of-the-tpp/ (quoting a MOFCOM spokesman); see also MOFCOM
Spokesman comments on the conclusion of TPP negotiations, MINISTRY OF
COM.:
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA
(Oct.
8,
2015),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201510/20151
001132863.shtml.
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procedures for corporate establishment, liberalization of capital
controls, and simplified customs clearance procedures, among
other things.125 Although the FTZs still have much to prove, their
establishment and the continuous promulgation of liberalizationoriented rules might have attested to the effect of TPP-driven
competitive liberalization.
C. Post-TPP Asian Regionalism: ASEAN+6 (RECP) to FTAAP?

One impact of the TPP on Asian regionalism is that the
TPP adjourned the process for several years by diverting the
interests and resources of some—but certainly not all—Asian
countries from the original economic integration path. As noted
previously, Asian economic integration progressed on the ASEANcentered approach for years, beginning with the ASEAN-China
FTA. Although there was a debate about whether Asian
regionalism should proceed on an ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 model,
at least both models involve all of the major countries in Asia. The
TPP, in contrast, is an FTA between a minority of Asian
economies and a few non-Asian countries. In this sense, it is not
even an Asian regionalism project. In terms of regional economic
integration, the TPP divided the Asians rather than joined them
together.
The withdrawal of the U.S. from the TPP has given Asian
economies no other choice but revert to the ASEAN+X type of
regionalism. This time, the only politically feasible model seems
to be the ASEAN+6 way, known now as the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”), the negotiations

125

Daniel Ren & Eric Ng, Beijing further relaxes rules on foreign
investment in FTZs, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 19, 2016, 3:29 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1991765/beijing-furtherrelaxes-rules-foreign-investment-ftzs.
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for which are ongoing as of this writing.126 This mega trade pact
aims to establish an integrated Pan-Asian market for half of the
world population and a third of global GDP.127 With a vision of “a
modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually-beneficial
economic partnership agreement among the ASEAN Member
States and ASEAN’s FTA partners,” the RCEP negotiations cover
trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic and
technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, legal and
institutional matters, and other issues, presumably covering almost
every aspect of the economy.128 Like the TPP, negotiations for the
RCEP have been conducted with a high degree of secrecy. It is
widely believed that the RCEP, assuming it can be completed, will
represent “shallow” rather than “deep” integration in trade
regionalism.
Much has also been said about the geopolitical aspect of the
RCEP, largely because pro-TPP politicians in the U.S. used the
126

See Carmen Ho, RCEP offers hope after TPP leaves the table,
ACCA
GLOBAL
(Apr.
1,
2017),
http://www.accaglobal.com/sg/en/member/member/accountingbusiness/2017/04/insights/rcep-tpp.html# (noting that “[w]ith the new US
administration’s rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Asian economies are
eyeing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership”); Yizhe (Daniel)
Xie, The World Needs RCEP, E. ASIA FORUM (Apr. 25, 2017),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/04/25/the-world-needs-rcep/ (noting that,
after the death of the TPP, “the world desperately needs a quick and big
globalization win, and RCEP is the best possible choice”); see also Reuters
Staff, China, Singapore seek to expedite RCEP trade talks, REUTERS (June 12,
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-singapore-trade/china-singaporeseek-to-expedite-rcep-trade-talks-idUSKBN1930RR (noting that “RCEP has
been given new impetus by U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement”).
127
See generally ASS’N OF S.E. ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018), for information about RCEP at the ASEAN
Secretariat’s website.
128
MINISTRY OF TRADE & INDUS. SING, FACTSHEET: WHAT YOU NEED
TO KNOW ABOUT REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP)
1, https://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/SiteAssets/Pages/FACTSHEET-WHATYOU-NEED-TO-KNOWABOUT/Factsheet%20on%20RCEP%20(June%202014).pdf (last updated June
2014).
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RCEP to push for the passage of TPP by the U.S. Congress.
President Obama, referring to the RCEP in his own writing said:
“China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up some of the
fast-growing markets in the world at our expense, putting
American jobs, businesses and goods at risk.”129
One
commentator even characterized “TPP vs. RCEP” as a battle
between America and China “for control of Pacific trade.”130
In a working paper published by the Asian Development
Bank (“ADB”), Shintaro Hamanaka contended that “TPP vs.
RCEP” signified a battle for control of membership and agenda in
regional integration groupings.131 Specifically, “the formation of
regional integration and cooperation frameworks can be best
understood as a dominant state’s attempt to create its own regional
framework where it can exercise some exclusive influence.”132 In
establishing its own regional system, the dominate/leader state
plays two games simultaneously: control of membership and
control of the agenda. “The core of the first game is the exclusion
of rivals. The essence of the second game is to set the agenda that
is convenient to the leader.”133 Hence, the essence of the politics
of regional economic grouping is exclusion “because the exclusion
of rival states is necessary for countries seeking to assume
leadership.”134
This theory may explain China’s intention to exclude the
U.S. at the early stage of Asian regionalism, as discussed
previously, and the notable exclusion of China from the TPP.
129

Obama, supra note 101.
Gordon Chang, TPP vs. RCEP: America and China Battle for
Control
of
Pacific
Trade,
NAT’L
INT.
(Oct.
6,
2015),
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-controlpacific-trade-14021.
131
Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership versus
Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda
Setting, (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 146, 2014),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/152753/reiwp-146.pdf.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 4.
134
Id. at 1.
130
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However, it can hardly be relied upon to expound the political
logic of RCEP. The logic is simple. In the RCEP, China controls
neither the membership nor the agenda. It is even submitted that,
contrary to the prevailing rhetoric that it is a China-backed trade
deal for balancing the TPP, the RCEP is simply an optional extra
in China’s regional vision. The relationship between China and
the RCEP can be seen from three angles.
First, the membership of the RCEP has never been
determined by China, let alone any form of Chinese control. As
noted previously, the RCEP, in terms of its membership, represents
exactly the ASEAN+6 model, which was the regional integration
pattern proposed by Japan—and objected by China—in the early
years of Asian regionalism.
Second, contrary to the popular belief that the RCEP was a
Chinese initiative in response to the upsurge of the TPP, it was
actually a proposal of the ASEAN. In 2012, a year after the TPP
partners issued the TPP Leader Statement in which they agreed to
the broad outlines of a high-standard trade agreement at the 2011
APEC Leaders meeting, which marked the official start of the
U.S.-led TPP negotiations, the ASEAN countries, driven by
Indonesia, decided to launch the RCEP at the 21st ASEAN and
Related Submits in Phnom, Cambodia.135 A year later, the
negotiations for RCEP commenced. China happily joined the
RCEP negotiations not because it could be a tool to exclude the
U.S., but because it saw this as an opportunity for it to overcome
its exclusion from the TPP and, accordingly, the Asian economic
integration process.

Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Joint Declaration on
the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (Nov. 20, 2012), http://asean.org/storage/2016/10/SEOM-AFPsBali-Annex-4-Joint-Declaration-on-the-Launch-of-Negotiations-for-theRCEP.pdf.
135
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Third, clearly the RCEP negotiations are championed by
ASEAN, not by China.136 As the Philippine Daily Inquirer put it,
“Southeast Asian nations will put priority on creating an Asiafocused trade pact that includes China, India and Japan,” and they
were glad that “[w]ith China putting its weight behind, RCEP has
emerged as the best alternative to lowering tariffs in the region.”137
However, as stated by the Philippine Trade Secretary Ramon
Lopez: “All the countries are looking at what’s mutually beneficial
for all, it won’t be lopsided, let’s say, in favor of China. China is
one of the participants.”138
Although China indicated the intention to conclude a RCEP
deal as quick as possible, it is not the major driving force behind
the negotiations.
The reported difficulties and differences
currently faced by RCEP negotiators hardly suggest that China is
playing a leading role or serving even as a coordinator. One of the
major differences lies under the contest between China and Japan,
as well as the suspicion of Chinese leadership in the negotiations.
As the Financial Times reported:
China is pushing for a rapid
conclusion
to
the
Regional
Comprehensive
Economic
Partnership, with a “low-quality”
deal mainly focused on lowering
tariffs between the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and its
neighbours. . . . But officials in
Japan and ASEAN insist RCEP
should not be Chinese-led. Beijing
136
See, e.g., ASEAN Pushes for Trade Pact; China Eyed, PHILIPPINE
DAILY
INQUIRER
(Apr.
27,
2017),
https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/philippine-dailyinquirer/20170427/281492161207574 (noting the remarks of the Philippine
Trade Secretary Ramon Lopez that “Southeast Asian countries this year will
prioritise creating an Asia-focused trade pact that includes China, India and
Japan, while trade issues with the United States will be put on the back burner”).
137
Id.
138
Id.
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wants to cast itself as a defender of
global free trade for political reasons,
they say, after the US quit another
huge
deal,
the Trans-Pacific
Partnership. Tokyo and Canberra
want a high-quality RCEP deal
covering services and investment—
half hoping this will bring the US
back to the TPP table.139
In addition, China’s ambition for an early deal must face
the protectionist stance of India. Interested in opening other
countries’ services markets but reluctant to grant Chinese exporters
lowered or zero tariff rates on manufactured products, India poses
a major hurdle to the successful conclusion of any economically
meaningful agreement.
In short, the differences and difficulties, arising out of the
distrust and different levels of economic development of RCEP
partners, are likely to lead to the conclusion of a low-grade FTA, if
an agreement can be reached at all. But still, if completed, the
RCEP will be a historically significant deal in terms of regional
integration in Asia for the following reasons. First, it will instill
confidence in free trade and globalization. The retreat from the
TPP and resort to economic nationalism of the Trump
Administration has tremendously undermined such confidence. If
the sixteen Asian countries, without the U.S., can reach a massive
FTA, such as the RCEP, this will undoubtedly give the free traders
a boost of motivation. Second, even though the RCEP becomes an
agreement for shallow integration, it can still “keep markets open,
deepen economic integration and narrow the development gap

139

Robin Harding, Tom Mitchell & Michael Peel, China and Japan vie
for control of Asia trade deal, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/d34d324c-03d8-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4

42

ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/20/2018 12:27 PM

2018 Between Power Politics & International Economic Law 425

among the member states.”140 Importantly, as Rebecca Fatima Sta
Maria put it, the RCEP model “may not be equivalent to the ‘gold
standard’ that the TPP espoused to be, but it will provide a clear
pathway toward that goal.”141 Further, the RCEP will provide a
platform to consolidate all of the ASEAN+1 agreements, thus
doing away the noodle-bowl effect to unifying the different rules
of origin and other regulatory formalities. Lastly, and probably
most significantly, the RCEP will be the first Pan-Asia FTA to
bring together all of the major economies in East, South, and
Pacific Asia into an integrated market, with profound implications
on the building of both a common Asian market and common
Asian identity.
In the long run, the exclusion of the U.S. and other AsiaPacific countries is not desirable, for both economic and
geopolitical reasons. Economically, Asian countries that do not
currently have an FTA with the U.S. would always be keen on
joining a mega-FTA in which the U.S. is a member, and that is
probably the reason why they found the TPP appealing.
Strategically, the sheer size of China’s economic and military
might would make smaller Asian countries feel that strong U.S.
involvement in Asia must be welcomed.142 In light of the recent
developments in Asian regionalization, as discussed above, the
concept of regional economic integration should not be
geographically limited to Asia in the traditional geography.
Instead, it should be Asia-Pacific in the long run, eyeing also
countries in the Americas side of the Pacific. The path to
regionalism in this vast area is ineludibly the FTAAP, an
agreement that covers possibly all of the Pacific Rim economies.

140

Rebecca Fatima Sta Maria, RCEP: More relevant than ever,
JAKARTA
POST
(Feb.
20,
2017,
8:49
AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/02/20/rcep-more-relevantnow-than-ever.html.
141
Id.
142
MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A
QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT 232 (C.L. Lim,
Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
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D. TPP and the Rule-Making in International Law: Implications for
Future Trade Agreements and China’s Pursuit to Become a RuleMaker

Even though the TPP as a trade agreement was abandoned
by the U.S., it is still a significant instrument from the perspective
of international economic law, and is already in the process of
shaping the direction of the international economic order. As
noted by Hufbauer and Cimino-Isaacs, the two “mega regionals—
[the TPP and TTIP]—will undoubtedly change the multilateral
trading system.”143 This will be true even if both crash as formal
FTAs, but “their negotiating objectives and ultimate stumbling
blocks will shape the future of the WTO.”144 This is certainly not
something that is very new in the history of the international
economic system. Pro-regionalism commentators have long
argued that FTAs can be the stepping stone to multilateral trade
liberalization.145 The proliferation of regional trade agreements
may not only spur multilateral negotiations, but also create new
rules which might eventually be ratified by the multilateral trading
system.146 For example, “NAFTA’s achievements in the realms of
intellectual property and services paved the way for new accords in
the Uruguay Round in 1994.”147
In the case of the TPP, for example, it has been suggested
that the WTO—lagging so far behind BITs and FTAs on regulating
investment—will eventually have to incorporate into its system the
now widely accepted investment rules developed by the bilateral
and regional deals regarding national treatment and preestablishment rights, negative-listing, compensation and
expropriation, and the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism,

143

Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, How will TPP and
TTIP Change the WTO System?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 679 (2015).
144
Id.
145
MAURICE SCHIFF & ALAN WINTERS, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 221-23 (Melissa Edeburn & Nancy Levine eds., World Bank &
Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
146
Id. at 229.
147
Hufbauer & Cimino-Isaacs, supra note 143, at 696.
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among others.148 This will be more obviously embedded in the
ongoing negotiations among the 23 WTO members on the Trade in
Services Agreement (“TiSA”), which currently excludes China’s
participation.149 The overlapping of TiSA’s membership and
objective with that of the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) will ensure that the TiSA is a
high standard service agreement. Given that the TiSA is the major
forum for services negotiations under the umbrella of the WTO, it
is highly likely that the rules of TiSA will be absorbed into the
WTO if the multilateral trading system would have any progress
on liberalization of service trades.150
A wide range of the TPP rules, especially those WTO-plus
provisions on further liberalization of trade and investment, are
widely accepted and even embodied in China’s ongoing bilateral
trade negotiations with existing and potential FTA partners. At the
very least, some of the TPP rules will become part of international
economic law binding upon China by way of incorporation into
China’s FTA deals, as well as an upgraded multilateral trading
system.
The success of the TPP in rule-making exemplifies the
explicated strategy of the U.S. in using FTAs like the TPP to
export American laws and make rules for the rest of the world. As
Barak Obama wrote in The Washington Post, “America should
148

Id. at 682.
TiSA is said to cover about 70% of the global trade in services.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION FACTSHEET ON TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT
(TISA)
2
(Sept.
26,
2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/september/tradoc_154971.doc.pdf.
150
Hufbauer & Cimino-Isaacs, supra note 143, at 689. TiSA is a
plurilateral agreement currently being negotiated by 23 WTO members of the
WTO. The negotiations, conducted under the umbrella of the WTO, aim to
further global liberalization of trade in services based on the WTO’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services. TiSa is open to all WTO members, which
“means that if enough WTO members join, TiSA could be turned into a broader
WTO agreement and its benefits extended beyond the current participants.” See
Trade in Services Agreement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/infocus/tisa/ (last visited March 28, 2018).
149
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write the rules. America should call the shots. Other countries
should play by the rules that America and our partners set, and not
the other way around.”151 Monopolizing the rule-making power in
international trade was the first strategic objective of the Obama
Administration in promoting the TPP.152 As noted by Michael
Froman, the last USTR in the Obama years, “[t]he Trans-Pacific
Partnership presents an unprecedented opportunity to update the
rules of the road.”153
Obama’s rejection of allowing China any power to “write
the rules,” however, touched a highly sensitive nerve in China,
resulting in China’s recent painful chase of the “discursive power”
in international affairs.154 The discursive power, or huayuquan, is
defined, in part, as the power to create norms and make rules in
international relations.155 A 2014 decision of the Chinese
Communist Party called for national efforts to be made to:
Vigorously participate in the
formulation of international norms,
promote the handling of foreignrelated economic and social affairs
according to the law, strengthen our
country’s discourse power and
influence in international legal
affairs, use legal methods to
safeguard our country’s sovereignty,

151

Obama, supra note 101.
Michael Froman, The Strategic Logic of Trade: New Rules of the
Road
for
the
Global
Market,
FOREIGN
AFF.
(2014),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/strategic-logic-trade.
153
Id.
154
See generally Kejin Zhao, Note, China’s Rise and Its Discursive
Power Strategy, CHINESE POL. SCI. REV., Sept. 2016, at 539.
155
Id. at 544 (noting that, in the Chinese understanding, discourse
power includes, in part, a country’s ability to “operate politically” which is
embodied in “agenda-setting, rule-making capacity and international
mobilization ability”).
152

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4

46

ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/20/2018 12:27 PM

2018 Between Power Politics & International Economic Law 429

security
interests.156

and

development

In an article titled Geopolitics, International Discursive Power,
and the Rule-Making Power in International Law,157 this author
pointed out that, for a country to own the rule-making international
discursive power, the following conditions must be met: (1) the
hard power including economic—and military power if necessary
—to influence other countries; (2) the soft power to develop
ideology and discourse that are appealing to other countries; (3) the
ability to create ideas as well as to process ideas into concrete rules
and policies; (4) the possession of public media which can be used
to communicate to the public at domestic and international level;
and (5) the political will to pro-actively participate in international
affairs.158 Using these criteria to evaluate China’s discursive
power, the article made the following conclusion with respect to
China’s rule-making ability at the international level:
China’s discursive power in the
international society is rather weak.
First, China does not have the ability
to develop ideas about international
affairs, international situation and
international relations, as well as to
convert the ideas into systems of
theories which can be used to
analyze international issues. The
lack of the ability to produce ideas
156

Robert Williams, A New Vocabulary for Engagement in US-China
Relations?, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 10, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/anew-vocabulary-for-engagement-in-us-china-relations/.
157
See Wáng Jiāngyǔ (王江雨) [Wang Jiangyu], Dìyuán Zhèngzhì,
Guójiā Huàyǔ Quán Yǔ Guójìfǎ Shàng de Guīzé Zhìdìng Quán (地缘政治，国
家话语权与国际法上的规则制定权) [Geopolitics, International Discursive
Power, and the Rule-Making Power in International Law], 2 ZHŌNGGUÓ FǍLǛ
PÍNGLÙN 39, 45 (2 中国法律评论 39, 45) [2 CHINA L. REV. 39, 45] (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2970391.
158
Id. at 42-43.
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and theories stems from the low level
of academic and policy research in
China. Second, China does not
possess the ability to propose new
international rules, or change or
improve existing international rules.
As widely known, the West has
dominated international rule-making
in the past several centuries. Very
few rules were proposed by nonWestern countries, including China.
At the inception of the People’s
Republic, it did propose some
theories and doctrines in the
international society, such as the
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” the doctrine of the “Three
Worlds,” etc., which, as discourse
and analytical frameworks, generated
significant impacts on the research
and
practice
in
international
relations. However, when China
entered the age of taoguang yanghui
(keeping a low profile and biding
one’s time), it was more inclined to
be a rule-taker rather than a rulemaker at the international level.
Furthermore, China tends to be
indifferent to and keep a distance
from those global affairs which it
believes its own interests are not
directly involved. . . . Third, the
number of Chinese employees in
international organizations is rather
small, and very few of them hold
decision-making
or
executive
positions.
Fourth,
China’s
expressions in speaking about
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international
affairs
and
communicating its own position are
rather difficult to be understood by
their audience in the international
society. . . . Lastly, but not least,
China is seriously short of pubic
media, which are regarded as
reputable and credible at the
international level.159
To the extent the contest for rule-making power is an issue in U.S.China trade relations, it is a battle that China cannot win at this
stage of its national development. It may be able to resist and
refuse to accept certain rules made by the U.S., but it does not have
the ability to create a new system of rules for FTAs or any other
area of the global economy, at least at this stage. This explains
why the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”)
decided to adopt a high-standard governance structure that
conforms to international best practice.160 This case suggests that,
even though China is in possession of the power to make rules, it
would choose to adopt the existing rules made by the West—
specifically the U.S.—rather than make a different set of rules of
its own.
IV.

U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS IN THE POST-TPP/TRUMP
ERA

Bilateral trade relations between China and the U.S. are
experiencing interesting times now, in ways full of mysterious
surprises. Donald J. Trump, in the campaigning months in 2016,
159

Id. at 43-44.
Zhōu Xiāoxiāo, Zhèng Qīngtíng & Wáng Léishēng (周潇枭;郑青亭
;王雷生) [Zhou Xiaomiao, Zheng Qingting & Wang Leisheng], Yà Tóuxíng
Kāiyè: Dǎzào Gāo Biāozhǔn Zhìlǐ Jiégòu de Duōbiān Jīgòu (亚投行开业：打
造高标准治理结构的多边机构) [AIIB Opens: Building a High-Standard
Governance Structure for a Multilateral Institution], 21ST CENTURY ECON. DAILY
(Zhang Xing ed., Jan. 19, 2016), http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/201601/19/content_29341.htm.
160
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vigorously attacked China's “unfair trade practices” and almost
labeled China as America’s economic enemy No.1.161 He vowed
to nominate China as a currency manipulator immediately after he
became President.162 Having been in the White House for more
than a year, Trump, however, has not adopted anything policy-wise
or institutionally to dramatically alter the status quo of U.S.-China
trade relations. On the other side, China remained rather cool in
dealing with Trump, generating an impression that it has the will
and capacity to face up to any challenges from the U.S. side, but is
still willing to talk with U.S. leaders about bilateral trade issues.
Suddenly, China and the U.S. announced a 100-day plan to
improve their strained trade ties at the Xi-Trump Summit in
Florida in early April of 2017.163 It was positively confirmed that
the 100-day, surprisingly proposed by the Chinese side, is aimed to
reduce China’s trade surplus with the U.S., for which China also
proposed unilateral economic concessions.164 However, the threats
of trade war between the two countries have always been looming
in U.S.-China relations in recent years.165

See Trump accuses China of ‘raping’ US with unfair trade policy,
BBC NEWS (May 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-201636185012; see also Keith Bradsher, In China-U.S. Trade War, Trump Would
Have
Weapons,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
10,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/business/international/trump-china-ustrade-war.html.
162
Doug Palmer & Ben Schreckinger, Trump vows to declare China a
currency manipulator on Day One, POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2015),
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/donald-trump-china-currencymanipulation-215679.
163
See Andrew Galbraith & Dominique Patton, U.S.-China trade talks
sputtering
at
100-day
deadline,
REUTERS
(July
16,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade/u-s-china-trade-talkssputtering-at-100-day-deadline-idUSKBN1A109V.
164
Id.
165
See John Authers, China bulls should be worried their view is now
the
consensus,
FIN.
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/589e9880-fb8d-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167; America,
China and the risk of trade war, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21715656-tradetensions-will-mount-destructive-trade-war-can-still-be.
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Seen in a broader context, the bedrock of U.S.-China trade
relations is undergoing critical and fundamental changes. In the
several decades since the two countries revived their trade relations
in the 1970s, bilateral trade between the two had several distinctive
features. First, for the U.S., trade with China was not only about
trade. Instead, it was part of the America’s grand strategy to
engage China, bring China into the Western dominated
international order, and promote economic liberalization,
marketization, and even political reform within China.166 Second,
the U.S. was largely a true believer, protector, and faithful
practitioner of free trade, and promoter of globalization.167 Third,
the U.S. opened its markets to China in exchange for China’s
acceptance of American leadership in the world, especially in the
Asia Pacific.168 On the Chinese side, starting from a low basis,
economic liberalization and marketization progressed steadfastly
and solidly for many years.169 For the above reasons, the U.S.
demonstrated “strategic forbearance” of formal and informal

166

See Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, The China Reckoning: How
Beijing Defied American Expectations, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./April, 2018, at 60,
62 (noting that generations of U.S. presidents and officials believed that
“[g]reater commercial interaction with China was supposed to bring gradual but
steady liberalization of the Chinese economy” and that “debt, inefficiency, and
the demands of a more advance economy would necessitate further reforms”).
167
See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE
ORIGINS, CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER
(Princeton Univ. Press 2012); see also John Ikenberry, The Future of the Liberal
World Order: Internationalism after America, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 56 (2011).
168
See generally G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of and the Future of the
West: Can the Liberal System Survive? 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (2008).
169
See generally SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC
REFORM IN CHINA (1993) (discussing China’s economic reform); ORVILLE
SCHELL & DAVID SHAMBAUGH, THE CHINA READER: THE REFORM ERA (1999)
(same); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(2011) (same); C. FRED BERGSTEN, CHARLES FREEMAN, NICHOLAS R. LARDY &
DEREK J. MITCHELL, CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
(Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ. 2008) (same); DOUG GUTHRIE, CHINA AND
GLOBALIZATION (Routledge 2006) (same).
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economic and trade policies and restrictions in China, which the
U.S. believes to be “unfair trade practices.”170
The ascendancy of President Trump in American politics
indicates that the fundamentals of the U.S.-China trade relations
are to be changed, fundamentally in some areas at least. Two such
changes are happening. First, a new consensus is being formed in
Washington, which holds largely the following view about U.S.China relations:
Because the American effort to
‘integrate’ China into the liberal
international
order
has
now
generated new threats to U.S.
primacy in Asia—and could result in
a consequential challenge to
American
power
globally—
Washington needs a new grand
strategy toward China that centers on
balancing the rise of Chinese power
rather than continuing to assist its
ascendancy.171
That is, the policy elites in the U.S. increasingly believe that their
country should give up the naïve idea of “peaceful transformation”
through which China would someday become a democratic market
economy and a responsible stakeholder in the international system
dominated by the U.S. Instead, it should view China as a
competitor, rivalry, and enemy if necessary, and abandon the
“strategic forbearance” of illegal or unfair Chinese behaviors.

170

See Campbell & Ratner, supra note 166, at 62-63 (noting that the
U.S. engaged China while “Beijing has resisted pressure from Washington and
elsewhere to level the playing field for foreign companies”).
171
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & ASHLEY J. TELLIS, COUNCIL SPECIAL
REPORT NO. 72, REVISING U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA 4 (Council
on Foreign Rel. Press 2015), https://www.cfr.org/report/revising-us-grandstrategy-toward-china.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4

52

ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/20/2018 12:27 PM

2018 Between Power Politics & International Economic Law 435

The second change is the rise of economic nationalism in
the U.S. represented by the election of the populist candidate
Donald Trump as the American President. President Trump
openly condemned free trade in his inaugural address by saying:
“We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries
making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our
jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”172
Shortly after he took office, he pulled the U.S. out of the TPP,173
signaled his Administration’s intention to bypass WTO decisions
when necessary,174 issued a new “Buy American, Hire American”

172

Donald J. Trump, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the Inaugural
Address (Jan. 20, 2017) (transcript available on www.whitehouse.gov).
173
Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United
States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, Donald
J. Trump, President of the United States, The White House (Jan. 23, 2017) (on
file with WhiteHouse.gov).
174
See, e.g., Evelyn Cheng, To get tough on China, Trump may throw
out
the
trade
rulebook,
CNBC
NEWS
(Jan.
8,
2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/05/trade-with-china-trump-may-get-tough-bybypassing-the-wto.html; Shawn Donnan & Demetri Sevastopulo, Trump team
looks to bypass WTO dispute system, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/7bb991e4-fc38-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30.
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executive order,175 and threatened to launch trade wars with trading
partners like China and Germany.176
China, the country with which the U.S. has the largest trade
deficit, realized that it must manage U.S.-China relations,
including trade issues, with great caution during the Trump era.
That possibly explains why President Xi Jiping was willing to offer
unilateral concessions to address the trade imbalance between
China and the U.S. This approach, it is submitted, might only
suppress the symptom without treating the condition, or, in
Chinese words, zhibiao bu zhiben. Truthfully, trade and economic
policies in both the U.S. and China have contributed to the
imbalance. In the U.S., it is the over-spending and over-borrowing
problems. In China, it is the lack of progress in economic reform.
China became the world’s second largest economy in 2010,177 but
economic reform has stalled for years. That is, the many
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restrictions maintained in the economy, which constraints both
foreign and domestic private business, do not match China’s
developmental stage and its status as a global economic power.
V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional economic integration/trade regionalism in Asia
started at the outset of this century. Although regional integration
makes great economic sense for Asian countries, it has progressed
rather slowly. China-Japan competition for regional leadership
plagued the beginning stage of economic regionalization in East
Asia. The rise of the TPP suspended the internal regionalization
process in Asia, and its demise—or the abandonment of it by the
Trump Administration—offers an opportunity for Asian countries
to revive Asia’s own regional integration projects, currently in the
form of the negotiations for the RCEP, which is more likely to be a
trade pact for shallow integration.
Several brief conclusions can be drawn from this Article’s
discussions. First, unconstrained power rivalry can be a permanent
curse for Asia’s economic integration, if the key players in the
region, including U.S., China, and Japan, always intend to exclude
each other from the integration process. Asian regionalism must
adopt an inclusive approach; otherwise it will never succeed.
Significantly, any integration process should be open to both China
and the U.S. A regionalization project without China will divide
Asia. If such a project purposefully excludes the U.S., it will be
wrecked by geopolitics. In this sense, the RCEP might be a lowgrade agreement if ever reached, but it will still be a landmark
agreement in the history of Asian regionalism because it is the first
trade pact that brings almost all of the economies in the region
together. In the long run, however, regional integration should go
beyond Asia to include the economies on the other side of the
Pacific, especially the U.S. The FTAAP is thus an avenue in this
sense, with both economic and strategic significance, to realize
Asia-Pacific economic integration.
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Second, the TPP was believed to be a geo-political tool to
contain China in Obama’s “rebalance to Asia” strategy. However,
it has also generated “competitive liberalization” effects, pushing
China to deepen its domestic economic reform as well as to engage
its trading partners on more friendly terms.
Third, although the TPP was deserted by the Trump
administration, it is still a landmark instrument for the making of
international economic law. The cutting-edge rules made in the
TPP laid a solid foundation for the development of high-standard
template agreements for FTAs of next generation. Many of those
rules are likely to be incorporated into the multilateral trading
system if the WTO is upgraded to a second version. Consequently,
China should understand that the death of the TPP does not amount
to the end of TPP rules. It must prepare itself for meeting the highstandards of TPP-style agreements at some point in the future.
Fourth, the landscape of U.S.-China trade relations has
fundamentally changed, symbolized by the intensified Chinese
effort to pursue global leadership and the rise of “America First”
policy with the election of President Trump. The “strategic
forbearance” in U.S.-China relations is fading away, and the U.S.
will demand more unilateral concessions from China, which has
economically benefited from trading with the U.S. The trade
relationship between the world’s two largest economies does not
need to be reset, but structural changes might have to be carried
out to further liberalize the Chinese market, as well as curtail the
over-spending in the U.S. In addition, China and U.S. should work
to rebuild confidence between them. This would require leaders of
the two countries to seriously consider the following: (1) what they
want from each other; (2) what international order they want to
live in; and (3) what their shared responsibility to the world is.
To conclude, if there is anything this author can
recommend for improving the China-U.S. trade relations, it would
be the following two advices. First, China should embark on a
new wave of economic liberalization, opening its markets wider to
both domestic private sectors and foreign business. Second, the
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two countries should begin to consider the negotiations for a U.S.China FTA. Such an FTA is doomed to be difficult and
complicated, but the advantages it can offer cannot be paralleled
by any other arrangement. Such an agreement—and even the
negotiation for it—can be used by the U.S. to pry open the Chinese
market. On the Chinese part, it can be used to push for domestic
reform, as the WTO did for China in the 1990s.
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